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102ND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION

PETER MIESZKOWSKI AND THE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM REVOLUTION
IN PUBLIC FINANCE
James R. Hines Jr., University of Michigan and NBER

INTRODUCTION

T

HE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING THE

implications of general equilibrium is by
now abundantly clear to researchers analyzing public finance issues. What is perhaps less
apparent is that this was not always so. The study of
public finance was radically transformed during the
15 years between 1959 and 1974 by the pioneering
efforts of a small number of leading scholars, notably including Peter Mieszkowski. Thanks to their
efforts, the analysis of applied problems in public
finance moved from partial equilibrium to general
equilibrium, providing the methods and insights
that characterize modern public economics.
The transformation began with the publication
of Richard Musgrave’s The Theory of Public
Finance (1959), a book that isolated and analyzed
the allocation, distribution, and stabilization functions of government in general equilibrium settings.
The subsequent analysis of deadweight loss, tax
incidence, optimal taxation, efficient provision of
public goods, fiscal federalism, tax competition,
behavioral responses to taxation, and a host of
other public finance issues grew from the general
equilibrium framework that Musgrave pioneered
and that were applied and developed by those
working on these issues in the 1960s and 1970s.
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM REASONING IN PUBLIC
FINANCE

As was evident from this and other research,
general equilibrium reasoning completely changes
thinking about tax incidence, the effects of taxation
on taxpayer behavior, the efficiency consequences
of taxation, optimal tax design, and the constraints
that governments face in setting tax policies. The
general equilibrium framework is so compelling
that it makes you wonder why researchers ever use
partial equilibrium tax analysis, though the answer
is simple: general equilibrium tax analysis is very
challenging. The lesson of general equilibrium is
not only that everything affects everything else –
but that everything affects everything else in two
ways: through supply and through demand. So

thinking one’s way through this thicket is unlikely
to be easy, particularly since human brains are
wired for partial equilibrium.
Simple tax analysis is not necessarily bad, but
partial equilibrium frameworks are capable of
offering answers that are, well, wrong. That is why
it is critically important to have tax analysis that
sensibly works through what general equilibrium
has to say, and that maps general equilibrium
insights into practical implications in a way that
normal human beings can understand. This begs
the question of whether normal human beings can
do general equilibrium tax analysis; the answer is
that we can now, but only because some abnormally
intelligent and sophisticated predecessors, notably
including Peter Mieszkowski, showed us how.
It is instructive to consider the implications
of general equilibrium for simple tax incidence
problems. In partial equilibrium, the incidence of
a tax is determined by supply and demand in the
market for the taxed activity. If supply is inelastic
or demand perfectly elastic, then the burden of a
tax is borne by suppliers; conversely, if demand is
inelastic or supply perfectly elastic, then the burden
of a tax is borne by buyers. In general equilibrium,
the partial equilibrium insights are still present,
but one also traces the impact of a tax through all
of the other markets that it may affect, which can
entirely change the answer. For example, in the case
of the Edgeworth/Hotelling taxation paradox, the
imposition of an excise tax can reduce the after-tax
price of a commodity through its effects on other
markets, even though all markets are perfectly
competitive (Edgeworth, 1897a, 1897b, 1897c;
Hotelling, 1932; Vickrey, 1960).
In the Harberger (1962) corporate income tax
model, a higher corporate income tax can increase
the returns to owners of corporations by depressing the demand for labor, if the corporate sector is
labor-intensive. The corporate income tax has two,
potentially offsetting, effects on capital demand,
one a partial equilibrium effect, the other a general
equilibrium effect. The partial equilibrium effect
is to encourage corporations to substitute labor for
capital inputs, thereby reducing capital demand; this
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was commonly understood to be the entirety of the
effect of corporate taxes prior to the appearance of
Harberger’s article. The general equilibrium effect
stems from the induced reallocation of production
in the economy. If the noncorporate sector of the
economy uses capital more intensively than does
the corporate sector (which is quite possible, since
the noncorporate sector includes capital-intensive
industries such as agriculture and real estate), then
the reallocation of production increases the demand
for capital. The net effect of the corporate tax on
capital demand, and therefore on returns to owners
of capital, thus depends on the combined effect of
substitution and reallocation, which is an empirical
question, and the subject of Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963), Cragg, Harberger, and Mieszkowski
(1967), and a host of subsequent studies. While
empirical studies have yet to reach a consensus on
the incidence of the corporate income tax, there
does appear to be a consensus that the tax must
be analyzed in the general equilibrium landscape
pioneered by Musgrave, Harberger, Mieszkowski,
and their colleagues. Indeed, since then public
finance economists have never been quite satisfied
with analyzing the incidence of any tax in partial
equilibrium, unless such analysis is supplemented
by general equilibrium considerations.
PETER MIESZKOWSKI ON GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
TAX INCIDENCE

Peter Mieszkowski published masterful papers in
the Journal of Political Economy in 1967 and the
Journal of Economic Literature in 1969 in which
he clearly elucidated and extended the general
equilibrium theory of tax incidence. As Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1980, p. 173) note, it was Mieszkowski
who in this 1967 Journal of Political Economy
paper identified what are now understood to be the
two main effects of corporate taxation in the Harberger model: the factor substitution effect and the
output effect. In a very forward-looking summary,
Mieszkowski (1967, p. 260) writes:
More generally, controversies, such as whether
taxes are shifted forward onto the consumer or
shifted back onto factor earnings, are seen to be
sterile when viewed in general equilibrium terms.
For example, a commodity tax on a particular commodity is shifted forward only in the sense that the
price of this commodity will rise relative to other
214

commodities, and this factor is of no interest if all
groups spend the same proportions of their incomes
on the same commodities. Furthermore, it is only
meaningful to talk of a partial factor tax’s being
shifted to consumers to the extent that relative commodity prices change and under the condition that
it is possible to ignore the factor-substitution effect
and the factor-intensity effects of this tax. The point
is, of course, that there are two sides to incidence,
the use of income and the source of income, and
there is no a priori reason why one side should be
given preference over the other.
Getting the theory right was just one piece of
what Peter Mieszkowski was up to, particularly
since conflicting forces made ultimate incidence
an empirical question. A separate paper of his
with John Cragg and Arnold Harberger (1967)
in the Journal of Political Economy carefully
reexamined the empirical analysis of the corporate
income tax by Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (1963),
offering fresh insights and raising doubts about
the type of time series empirical analysis that was
then very common.
THE “NEW VIEW” OF THE PROPERTY TAX

There was a great deal of confusion over competing views of the impact of the property tax prior
to the publication of Peter Mieszkowski’s seminal
paper presenting the “new view” of the property tax
in the Journal of Public Economics in 1972. The
Mieszkowski paper shows how to reconcile these
views, and offers the nicely derived interpretation
that under certain conditions the burden of even
a local property tax falls ultimately on national
capital (as well as having some local effects).
In the Mieszkowski framework, a local property
tax discourages local property investment, thereby
indirectly increasing capital investment elsewhere.
This depresses the pretax return to capital elsewhere, ultimately burdening all capital owners.
There nevertheless remain important local effects,
and local incidence, of the property tax, but you
miss something terribly important by ignoring
the effect of the tax on capital everywhere. This
interpretation was subsequently christened by
others as the “new view” of the property tax; it is
very important, and it still feels new.
The Mieszkowski paper on the “new view”
appeared in the inaugural issue of the Journal
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of Public Economics (April 1972). That issue
featured a superstar lineup of contributors: Leif
Johanson; James Buchanan and Charles Goetz;
Martin Feldstein; Peter Mieszkowski; Anthony
Atkinson and Joseph Stiglitz; Mervyn King; and
Agnar Sandmo. One indication of the importance
of the Mieszkowski paper on the “new view” is
that, on the front cover of the paper copy of this
issue of the Journal of Public Economics from
the UC-Berkeley economics department library,
someone circled the title of the Mieszkowski paper
and wrote in the margin, “this is the good one.”
OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS

Peter Mieszkowski has done extremely influential work on interjurisdictional competition in a
variety of contexts, including his 1986 Journal of
Urban Economics paper with George Zodrow that
analyzes a setting in which jurisdictions compete to
attract mobile capital. In this model, tax competition
leads to low tax rates, thereby producing inefficiently small public sectors – inefficient in the sense
that coordinated policies among jurisdictions would
produce a Pareto improvement. How much of this
actually happens in our world? I’m not sure, and
no one else is either – but what I do know for sure
is that the standard framework for analyzing these
questions dates to the publication of this article.
Populations are also mobile, and Peter Mieszkowski’s extremely important 1974 Journal of
Public Economics paper with Frank Flatters and
Vernon Henderson considered a setting in which
individuals are mobile and there are imperfectly
corrected congestion externalities, finding that the
migration process significantly affects the efficiency
of local public good provision. Intergovernmental
grants have the potential to affect these outcomes,
and this article and follow-up work by Peter Mieszkowski and George Zodrow (in the Journal of
Economic Literature, 1989) and Peter Mieszkowski
and Richard Musgrave (in the National Tax Journal,
1999) evaluated these and other issues.
A “NEW VIEW” OF PETER MIESZKOWSKI

The decades of the 1960s and 1970s are
remembered for many things; one of the things
for which they surely should be remembered is
the transformation that took place in the way that
public economics was understood and practiced.

The essence of Peter Mieszkowski’s “new view”
of the property tax is that the tax policies of one
jurisdiction, however small, can have significant
price effects elsewhere.
Can the same be true of individuals? Can it be
that the activities of a lone scholar, thinking deeply
and publishing his insights, can affect the world
of scholars in such a significant way? Of course it
can.
We have Peter Mieszkowski and a very small
number of others to thank for utterly transforming
the way that the rest of us think about taxation –
and not in some arid, abstract manner, but in a
very real and practical way, connected to theory,
connected to data, and connected to the tax policies
that concern the world every day.
Cast in “new view” terms, Peter Mieszkowski’s
work lowered the cost of insight for the rest of us.
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